Homework 5, Econ 606

Jonathan Heathcote

Due in class, Tuesday April 4th

Consider the following consumption-savings problem:

An individual faces two possible realizations for their wage in each period, $w \in \{w_l, w_h\}$ where $0 < w_l < w_h$.

At time zero, w_0 may be high or low with equal probability.

In subsequent periods, wages evolve stochastically according to a Markov process defined by the transition probability matrix π .

The individual must choose consumption c_t , savings in a non-contingent bond a_{t+1} and hours worked, n_t at each date t to maximize expected lifetime utility, where utility associated with an allocation $\{c_t, n_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$ is given by

$$\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t u(c_t, n_t)$$
$$u(c_t, n_t) = \frac{1}{1-\gamma} \left[c_t - \frac{\psi n_t^{1+\frac{1}{\varepsilon}}}{1+\frac{1}{\varepsilon}} \right]^{1-\gamma}$$

where $\psi, \varepsilon, \gamma > 0$ (these are known as Greenwood, Hercowitz and Huffmann preferences)

Suppose that initial wealth at time zero is given by a_0 and that borrowing is not permitted: $\phi = 0$. Hours and consumption must be non-negative (there is no upper bound on hours). Suppose that the net interest rate on bonds is r. Suppose that $\beta(1+r) < 1$

- 1. Formulate the individual's maximization problem recursively
- 2. Write down the first order conditions
- 3. What is the elasticity of hours worked with respect to the wage?

Consider a version of this model with a very large number (continuum) of agents, where each agent draws wage shocks independently. Imagine that a planner chooses allocations. The planner cannot transfer resources across time.

- 4. Define the planner's problem
- 5. Characterize the allocations that solve the planner's problem.

- (a) Does the planner equalize consumption across all agents at a given date?
- (b) Does the planner redistribute resources from high wage workers to low wage workers?

Return to the individual's problem with a single non-contingent bond. Suppose now the utility function is

$$u(c_t, n_t) = \frac{c_t^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma} - \frac{\psi n_t^{1+\frac{1}{\varepsilon}}}{1+\frac{1}{\varepsilon}}$$

- 6. Compute an upper bound on the interest rate \overline{r} such that for $r \leq \overline{r}$ the agent will always choose $a_{t+1} = 0$.
- 7. For $r \leq \overline{r}$ characterize conditions on parameter values such that an increase in the wage translates to an increase in hours worked.
- 8. Suppose that wage shocks are *iid* over time, and suppose parameters are such that for $r \leq \overline{r}$ wages and hours are negatively correlated. Will increasing r above \overline{r} tend to increase or reduce the covariance between wages and hours (just provide an intuitive argument)?